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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
This is an appeal from a District Court order dismissing 
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254. The District Court dismissed the petition under 
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), holding that the 
petition, which advanced three claims, contained two that 
were unexhausted and was therefore a "mixed petition." On 
appeal, Wenger contends that the supposedly unexhausted 
claims would no longer be entertained by the Pennsylvania 
courts. Wenger argues that these claims, although never 
fairly presented to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 
should be regarded as exhausted by virtue of a general 
order issued by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in May 
2000. See In re: Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal 
and Post-Conviction Relief Cases, No. 218 Judicial 
Administration Docket No. 1 (Pa. May 9, 2000). Wenger also 
maintains that, even if these claims were procedurally 
defaulted, the procedural default has been waived. In 
addition, he contends that his third claim has clearly been 
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exhausted, has not been procedurally defaulted, and 
consequently should have been entertained on the merits 
by the District Court. For the reasons explained below, we 





In October 1984, Robert Wenger was arrested and 
charged in the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County 
with murder of the first degree (18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
S 2502(a)), murder of the third degree (18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. S 2502(c)), voluntary manslaughter (18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. S 2503(a)(1)), and aggravated assault (18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. S 2702(a)(l)). A preliminary hearing was held, and 
Wenger was held for court. Wenger and the Commonwealth 
later negotiated a plea agreement under which the 
Commonwealth did not seek the death penalty and Wenger 
pled guilty to criminal homicide generally. After Wenger 
pled, a degree-of-guilt hearing was held in May 1985, and 
Wenger was found guilty of murder of the first degree. As 
required by Pennsylvania law, see 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
S 1102(a); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 9756(c), Wenger was 
sentenced in November 1985 to a term of life imprisonment 
without parole. 
 
Wenger appealed to the Superior Court. The sole issue 
raised on appeal concerned the sufficiency of the evidence 
to support the trial court's finding that he was guilty of 
murder of the first degree. The Superior Court affirmed, 
and Wenger did not file a petition for allowance of appeal 
with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 
 
In February 1988, Wenger filed a petition under 
Pennsylvania's Post-Conviction Hearing Act ("PCHA"), 42 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. SS 9541 et seq., amended and renamed 
Post-Conviction Relief Act by the Act of April 13, 1988, P.L. 
336, No. 47. Wenger raised three claims. He argued (1) that 
his trial counsel was ineffective for erroneously advising 
him "that he would be released within ten years if he was 
sentenced to life imprisonment," (2) that his trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to advise him concerning 
withdrawal of his guilty plea, and (3) that his trial counsel 
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was ineffective in failing to preserve the right to petition for 
allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 
 
The Court of Common Pleas held a hearing and received 
testimony from Wenger, his father, mother, and brother, 
and his trial attorney. See Commonwealth v. Wenger, Nos. 
CC-472-84 and CC-496-84 (Adams County Ct. Coin. P1. 
Oct. 22, 1990). Wenger's attorney testified that he did not 
give incorrect estimates of Wenger's potential sentence, and 
the court found this testimony to be credible. The court 
then stated that Wenger had engaged in an extensive 
colloquy with the court at the time of his plea, and 
therefore Wenger understood that he would be sentenced to 
imprisonment for life. The court rejected Wenger's second 
claim because Wenger knew of his right to withdraw his 
guilty plea and Wenger did not request that his attorney 
move to do so. Finally, the court denied relief on Wenger's 
third claim because Wenger's counsel had taken a direct 
appeal to the Superior Court, and granting leave to seek 
direct appellate review by the state supreme court at this 
late stage would be redundant in light of Wenger' s post- 
conviction proceedings. The court therefore dismissed 
Wenger's petition, and Wenger took a timely appeal to the 
Superior Court, raising the same three issues. The Superior 
Court affirmed the dismissal in April 1991, and Wenger 
failed to file a timely petition for allowance of appeal with 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Wenger later filed a 
petition for leave to file a petition for allowance of appeal 
nunc pro tunc, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied 
that request in March 1992. 
 
In January 1997, Wenger filed a petition under 
Pennsylvania's revised Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 9541 et seq. This petition, as 
ultimately amended, claimed that Wenger's conviction 
resulted from a guilty plea that had been unlawfully 
induced, that an unlawful sentence of life imprisonment 
without parole had been imposed, and that Wenger had 
been denied the effective assistance of counsel. In a 
memorandum submitted with this motion, Wenger 
discussed various theories supporting his claim that his 
sentence was illegal. Among other things, Wenger raised the 
following question: 
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       Are legal definitions and common understandings of 
       the terms "life imprisonment" and "life imprisonment 
       without [right to] parole" constitutionally 
       distinguishable such that imposition of the latter as an 
       equivalent substitute for the former invokes protection 
       of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
       Amendment as well as the Cruel and Unusual 
       Punishment prohibitions of the Eighth Amendment? 
 
App. 59-60. For convenience, we will refer to this argument 
as the "Due Process/Eighth Amendment" argument. 
 
The Court of Common Pleas dismissed the petition and 
issued an opinion. The court noted that one of Wenger's 
contentions in his first petition for post-conviction relief 
was that "plea counsel erroneously told and led[him] to 
believe that his exposure was ten years at most." App. 66. 
The court noted that it had previously rejected this 
argument and had found "that defendant clearly 
understood that he would be sentenced to life 
imprisonment." Id. The court further observed that this 
decision has been affirmed by the Superior Court. Id. The 
court then noted that the current petition also alleged "that 
counsel was ineffective for failing to advise [Wenger] that 
life meant life without parole," and the court observed that 
this "assertion is nothing more than a reworked version of 
a previously litigated claim" and did not justify either a 
hearing or relief. Id. 
 
The court then added: 
 
       Additionally, defendant has sought permission to 
       amend his petition in order to attack the legality of his 
       sentence. Although we are impressed with defendant's 
       brief, we decide the challenge does not entitle him to 
       relief. A sentence of life imprisonment is legal and 
       violates neither equal protection nor the prohibition 




Wenger appealed this decision to the Superior Court and 
raised two arguments. He contended that "plea counsel's 
ineffective assistance violated rights guaranteed by the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
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Constitution," and he asserted the Due Process/Eighth 
Amendment argument. App. 70. 
 
The Superior Court affirmed. The court wrote that it 
"need not reach and discuss the issues posited on this 
second appeal for ineffectiveness relief " because, as the 
court below had put it, the current appeal was " `nothing 
more than a reworked version of a previously litigated claim 
and does not justify either a relief or hearing.' " App. 71-72. 
The court stated that it had "already ruled on the merits of 
whether the guilty plea was entered knowingly and 
intelligently" and added: "We are constrained to conclude 
that the only issues that Wenger now seeks to present to 
this tribunal have been previously litigated." Id. at 72-73. 
 
Wenger filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The only issue raised was the 
Due Process/Eighth Amendment argument. Leave to appeal 
was denied in May 1998. 
 
Wenger then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
under 28 U.S.C. S 2254 in the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The petition raised 
the following three claims: 
 
       1. Whether petitioner was denied his right to effective 
       assistance of counsel based on counsel's erroneous 
       advice that even if a life term was imposed, petitioner 
       would only be required to serve a seven to ten year 
       term of imprisonment before parole? 
 
       2. Whether petitioner was denied effective assistance 
       of counsel when plea counsel failed to confer with the 
       petitioner regarding withdrawal of the plea and 
       counsel's failure to file such a motion? 
 
       3. Whether legal definitions and common 
       understandings of the terms "life imprisonment" and 
       "life imprisonment without parole" are Constitutionally 
       distinguishable such that imposition of the latter as an 
       equivalent substitute for the former invokes protection 
       of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
       Amendment as well as the cruel and unusual 
       punishment prohibitions of the Eighth Amendment? 
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The Magistrate Judge to whom the case was referred 
recommended that Wenger's petition be dismissed for 
failure to exhaust state remedies, and the District Court 
adopted that recommendation. The District Court 
concluded that the first two claims had not been fairly 
presented to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and were 
thus unexhausted. The court noted that Wenger had 
argued that, if the first two claims were found to be 
unexhausted, he wished to delete them and proceed with 
only the third, exhausted claim. The court rejected that 
request, however, because Wenger had not filed a motion to 
amend or resubmit his habeas corpus petition. The court 





We first consider the question whether the two ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims presented in Wenger's federal 
habeas petition remain unexhausted. With two exceptions 
not applicable here, 28 U.S.C. S 2254(b)(1) provides that 
"[an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a 
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 
court shall not be granted unless it appears that . . . the 
applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the 
courts of the State."1 Under 28 U.S.C. S 2254(c), such a 
petitioner "shall not be deemed to have exhausted the 
remedies available in the courts of the State . . . if he has 
the right under the law of the State to raise, by any 
available procedure, the question presented." In O'Sullivan 
v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999), the Supreme Court held 
that while exhaustion does not demand that state prisoners 
"invoke extraordinary remedies," "state prisoners must give 
the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any 
constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the 
State's established appellate review process." Id. at 844-45. 
This means, the Court explained, that state prisoners must 
"file petitions for discretionary review when that review is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Because Wenger's federal petition was filed after the effective date of 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the version of S 2254 
as amended by that Act applies. 
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part of the ordinary appellate review procedure in the 
State." Id. at 847. The Court further noted that, in 
determining whether a state prisoner has preserved an 
issue for presentation in a federal habeas petition,"we ask 
not only whether a prisoner has exhausted his state 
remedies, but also whether he has properly exhausted 
those remedies, i.e., whether he has fairly presented his 
claims to the state courts." Id. at 848. If a claim has not 
been fairly presented to the state courts but further state- 
court review is clearly foreclosed under state law, 
exhaustion is excused on the ground of futility. See, e.g., 
Lines v. Larkin, 208 F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 2000); Toulson 
v. Beyer, 987 F.2d 984, 987-88 (3d Cir. 1993). Under those 
circumstances, the claim is procedurally defaulted, not 
unexhausted, and the claim may be entertained in a federal 
habeas petition only if there is a basis for excusing the 
procedural default. Procedural default may be excused if a 
petitioner can show "cause" and "prejudice" or that a 
"fundamental miscarriage of justice" would result. Edwards 
v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 551 (2000). 
 
In the present case, Wenger raised his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims before the Court of Common 
Pleas and the Superior Court in his first state petition for 
collateral review, and both of those courts entertained (and 
rejected) those claims on the merits. However, Wenger did 
not "fairly" present those claims to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, because he did not file a timely petition for 
allowance of review. Although he did seek leave for 
permission to file such a petition out of time, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied that petition. Under 
those circumstances, the claims were not fairly presented 
to the state supreme court. Caswell v. Ryan, 953 F.2d 853, 
858-60 (3d Cir. 1992). It is also apparent that Wenger did 
not fairly present these claims to the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court in connection with his second state petition for 
collateral review. While Wenger did file a timely petition for 
allowance of appeal on that occasion, his petition did not 
raise the ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
 
Thus, if it was necessary under O'Sullivan for Wenger to 
present these claims to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court -- 
that is to say, if the filing of a petition for allowance of 
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appeal was "part of the ordinary appellate review procedure 
in the state" -- the claims were not properly exhausted. It 
is apparent, however, that the Pennsylvania courts would 
no longer entertain those claims, see Doctor v. Walters, 96 
F.3d 675, 681-82 (3d Cir. 1996), and neither Wenger nor 
the Commonwealth suggests otherwise. Indeed, the Court 
of Common Pleas and the Superior Court refused to 
consider these claims on the merits when Wenger 
attempted to raise them in his second state collateral 
attack. Accordingly, exhaustion would be excused on the 
basis of futility, and the claims would be subject to the 
doctrine of procedural default. Under these circumstances, 
we must decide whether the filing of a petition for 
discretionary review by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
was "part of the ordinary appellate review procedure in the 
state" at the time or times in question. 
 
Wenger maintains that discretionary review by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court is not part of the ordinary 
process of appellate review by virtue of Order 218, which 
was issued by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in May 
2000. That order provides as follows: 
 
       AND NOW, this 9th day of May, 2000, we hereby 
       recognize that the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 
       reviews criminal as well as civil appeals. Further, 
       review of a final order of the Superior Court is not a 
       matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and an 
       appeal to this Court will only be allowed when there 
       are special and important reasons therefor. Pa.R.A.P. 
       1114. Further, we hereby recognize that criminal and 
       post-conviction relief litigants have petitioned and do 
       routinely petition this Court for allowance of appeal 
       upon the Superior Court's denial of relief in order to 
       exhaust all available state remedies for purposes of 
       federal habeas corpus relief. 
 
       In recognition of the above, we hereby declare that in 
       all appeals from criminal convictions or post-conviction 
       relief matters, a litigant shall not be required to 
       petition for rehearing or allowance of appeal following 
       an adverse decision by the Superior Court in order to 
       be deemed to have exhausted all available state 
       remedies respecting a claim of error. When a claim has 
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       been presented to the Superior Court, or to the 
       Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and relief has been 
       denied in a final order, the litigant shall be deemed to 
       have exhausted all available state remedies for 
       purposes of federal habeas corpus relief. 
 
       This Order shall be effective immediately. 
 
This Order was in all likelihood prompted by Justice 
Souter's concurring opinion in O'Sullivan. In that opinion, 
Justice Souter stated that he understood O'Sullivan "to 
have left open the question . . . whether [the Court] should 
construe the exhaustion doctrine to force a State, in effect, 
to rule on discretionary review applications when the State 
has made it plain that it does not wish to require such 
applications before its petitioners may seek federal habeas 
relief." 526 U.S. at 849 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice 
Souter went on to note the example of an order issued by 
the Supreme Court of South Carolina that is similar to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Order 218. Id. Wenger 
interprets the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Order No. 218 
to mean that he exhausted his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims when he raised those claims in the Court of 
Common Pleas and the Superior Court in his first petition 
for state collateral review and that his failure fairly to 
present those claims to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is 
immaterial for exhaustion purposes. 
 
After hearing oral argument in this case, we requested 
the parties to provide supplemental submissions addressing 
the question whether Order 218 "applies to a case in which 
the time for filing a petition for discretionary review expired 
prior to the date of the order." We also invited the Attorney 
General of Pennsylvania to provide an amicus submission 
on this question. In that submission, the Attorney General 
contended that Order 218 should not be interpreted as 
having a retroactive effect and also that the Order was 
issued in violation of the state constitution. The Attorney 
General argued that the Order purports to alter the state 
supreme court's jurisdiction but that under the state 
constitution the state supreme court may not alter the 
jurisdiction of any court. Pa. Const. art. V, S 10(c). 
 
Although it will undoubtedly be necessary for our court 
to address the broader question whether the filing of a 
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petition for discretionary review with the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court is now "part of the ordinary appellate 
review procedure in the state," we find it unnecessary to 
reach that issue here. In this case, we find it sufficient to 
hold that Order 218 did not retroactively alter the nature of 
"the ordinary appellate review procedure" in the 
Commonwealth. We reach this conclusion for three 
reasons. 
 
First, we believe that the language of the Order, although 
not in itself conclusive, suggests that the Order was 
intended to be prospective only. The Order states that the 
court "hereby declare[s]" that, in appeals from criminal 
convictions or post-conviction relief matters, "a litigant shall 
not be required to petition for rehearing or allowance of 
appeal." Order No. 218, supra (emphasis added). The Order 
also states that it is "effective immediately." On the whole, 
this language seems to us to be forward-looking. 
 
Second, what we understand to be the primary purpose 
of this Order and others like it would not be served by 
retroactive application. Orders of this type are based on the 
view that requiring state prisoners to file petitions for 
discretionary review in order to pave the way for federal 
habeas petitions does little good (because so few petitions 
for discretionary review are granted) but imposes a burden 
on overworked state supreme courts and produces 
pointless delay. See O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 849 (Souter, J., 
concurring; id. at 863 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In his dissent 
in O'Sullivan, Justice Breyer cited the low percentage of 
petitions granted by several state supreme courts. Id. at 
863 (Breyer, J., dissenting). He then observed: 
 
       On the majority's view, these courts must now consider 
       additional petitions for review of criminal cases, which 
       petitions will contain many claims raised only to 
       preserve a right to pursue those claims in federal 
       habeas proceedings. The result will add to the burdens 
       of already overburdened state courts and delay further 
       a criminal process that is often criticized for too much 
       delay. 
 
Id. at 863. He expressed "optimism," however, because of 
the suggestion in Justice Souter's concurrence that a state 
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could, if it desired, eliminate the requirement of having 
such claims raised in petitions for discretionary review to 
the state's highest court. Id. at 864. The interests cited by 
Justice Breyer -- relieving the burden on state supreme 
courts and preventing delay -- would obviously not be 
served by retroactive application of Order 218. See Mattis v. 
Vaughn, 128 F. Supp. 2d 249, 262 (E.D. Pa. 2001). Any 
petitions filed prior to that Order solely for the purpose of 
satisfying the federal exhaustion requirement still had to be 
passed upon by the state supreme court, and federal 
habeas review was still delayed until that was done. 
 
Third, we find it difficult to see how the federal habeas 
statute could accommodate retroactive application. We 
must not lose sight of the fact that the question before us 
is whether or not the filing of a petition for allowance of 
appeal was an "available" state remedy in 1991. 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254(b)(l)(A). Whether a remedy was or was not "available" 
appears to us to be a question of objective historical fact. 
While a state may, of course, prospectively change the 
remedies that are available under state law, if a remedy was 
available or unavailable at some time in the past, it is 
difficult to see how that fact can be retroactively altered. 
Our court has previously held that a petition for allowance 
of appeal is an available remedy in Pennsylvania, and we 
have held that claims were not exhausted or were 
procedurally defaulted because such review was not sought 
See e.g., Evans v. Court of Common Pleas , 959 F.2d 1227, 
1230 (3d Cir. 1992); Caswell, 953 F.2d at 860; Beatty v. 
Patton, 700 F.2d 110, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1983). Whatever 
prospective effect Order 218 has, we do not think it in effect 
overrules those decisions as they pertain to cases that had 
passed that procedural juncture prior to the Order. 
 
For all these reasons, we hold that Order 218 does not 
apply in cases in which the time to petition for review by 
the state supreme court expired prior to the date of the 
order. For Wenger, this means that his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims are procedurally defaulted 
and, because he has not argued any ground for excusing 
that default, it would appear that federal habeas review of 
these claims is barred. 
 
                                12 
  
Wenger maintains, however, that the Commonwealth has 
waived this default. In making this argument, Wenger relies 
on Hull v. Kyler, 190 F.3d 88 (3d Cir. 1999), but we find 
that case to be inapposite. In Hull, the prisoner raised the 
relevant claim in the Court of Common Pleas and the 
Superior Court, but his attorney failed to file a timely 
petition for allowance of appeal to the state supreme court. 
190 F.3d at 98. Subsequently, however, in a collateral 
proceeding, "Hull sought, and received, from the . . . Court 
of Common Pleas leave to file a petition for allowance of 
appeal nunc pro tunc to the state supreme court" from the 
prior Superior Court decision that had rejected the claim on 
the merits. Id. (emphasis in original)."The leave was 
granted on the basis of his post-conviction counsel's 
ineffectiveness in failing to timely file such a petition 
originally or to notify Hull of this failure in a timely 
fashion." Id. The order granting this relief was never 
reversed by the state courts; Hull filed a nunc pro tunc 
petition for allowance of appeal; and the state supreme 
court denied that petition without comment. Id . We held 
that the granting of leave to file the petition nunc pro tunc 
constituted a waiver by the state courts of the prior 
procedural default. Id. at 98-99. 
 
Wenger argues that, if he procedurally defaulted his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims when he failed to 
file a timely petition for allowance of appeal from the 1991 
decision of the Superior Court, the Court of Common Pleas 
waived that default in his subsequent PCRA proceeding 
when the court dismissed that petition, not on the ground 
that the ineffective assistance claims had been defaulted or 
waived, but on the ground that they had been "previously 
litigated." Appellant's Br. at 18. We reject this argument. 
 
Under the PCRA, a petitioner must prove that an 
"allegation of error has not been previously litigated or 
waived." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 9543(a)(3). An allegation 
is considered to have been "previously litigated" if "the 
highest appellate court in which the petitioner could have 
had review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of 
the issue" or the allegation "has been raised and decided in 
a proceeding collaterally attacking the conviction or 
sentence." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. SS 9544(a)(2)and (3). 
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Thus, the holding of the Court of Common Pleas in 
Wenger's PCRA proceeding that his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims had been "previously litigated" merely 
signified that the Superior Court ("the highest appellate 
court in which the petitioner could have had review as a 
matter of right") had ruled on the merits of those claims (as 
it indisputably had in the earlier appeal in the PCHA 
proceeding) and/or that the claims had "been raised and 
decided in a proceeding collaterally attacking the conviction 
or sentence" (which also plainly occurred in the earlier, 
PCHA proceeding). Although the Court of Common Pleas 
did not also say that the claims had been "waived," the 
court did not say that they had not been"waived," and in 
any event, the question whether the claims were"waived" 
within the meaning of the PCRA is analytically distinct from 
the question whether they were exhausted or procedurally 
defaulted for federal habeas purposes. In Hull , as we have 
noted, the procedural default was found to have been 
waived because a state court in effect granted him leave to 
cure his prior default, and he did so. Nothing comparable 
happened here. 
 
We therefore hold that Wenger's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims, although exhausted, have been 





The final question that we must consider is whether we 
may affirm the dismissal of Wenger's Due Process/Eighth 
Amendment claim. As noted, the District Court dismissed 
Wenger's entire petition, including this claim, on the 
ground that it was "mixed," but this was incorrect. As we 
said in Toulson: 
 
       A petition containing unexhausted but procedurally 
       barred claims in addition to exhausted claims, is not a 
       mixed petition requiring dismissal under Rose . 
       Although the unexhausted claims may not have been 
       presented to the highest state court, exhaustion is not 
       possible because the state court would find the claims 
       procedurally defaulted. 
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       The district court may not go to the merits of the 
       barred claims, but must decide the merits of the claims 
       that are exhausted and not barred. 
 
987 F.2d at 987 (internal citations omitted). 
 
The Commonwealth contends, however, that Wenger's 
Due Process/Eighth Amendment claim was never fairly 
presented to the state courts because it was not raised on 
direct appeal or in the PCHA proceeding and was not 
presented to the Court of Common Pleas in an adequate 
way in the PCRA proceeding. We cannot agree. 
 
We interpret the decision of the Court of Common Pleas 
in the PCRA proceeding as rejecting this claim on the merits.2 
The claim was next raised on appeal to the Superior Court, 
and the Superior Court affirmed without addressing this 
issue. We must therefore assume that the decision of the 
Superior Court rests on the same ground as that of the 
Court of Common Pleas. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker , 501 U.S. 
797, 803 (1991) ("Where there has been one reasoned state 
judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders 
upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest 
upon the same ground.") Finally, the issue was raised in a 
timely petition for allowance of appeal to the state supreme 
court, and that court denied review without comment. As a 
result, the claim was exhausted. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801 
("If the last state court to be presented with a particular 
federal claim reaches the merits, it removes any bar to 
federal-court review that might otherwise have been 
available."). 
 
We therefore hold that this claim is cognizable under 
S 2254 and should be considered by the District Court on 
remand. Needless to say, we express no view regarding the 
merits of the claim. We thus reverse the decision of the 
District Court dismissing Wenger's petition in its entirety 




2. As noted, after rejecting Wenger's ineffective assistance claims as 
"nothing more than a reworked version of a previously litigated claim," 
the court addressed what we understood as the equivalent of the Due 
Process/Eighth Amendment claim as an "[a]dditional[ ]" claim. App. 66. 
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